War and cost-efficiency

There are at least two ways of looking at the rationality of warfare: success rate and the price paid for success. In the past, warfare could often be expected to be a successful policy option. During the era between Napoleon and WWI about 80% of the wars were won by the aggressor. Yet from WWI to the end of the Cold War the figure dropped dramatically to about 40%.

History has shown that it is impossible to precisely predict future developments as the visions of the future and the practical realities of military operations seldom match. However, there is nothing that would indicate that warfare is becoming a more rational policy option in terms of the expected rate of victory.

Moreover, the price paid for victory is often more important than victory itself when the offensive and defensive options are weighed. We can calculate a simple measure of cost efficiency by dividing military performance by its cost. It is striking how good radical islamists like the Taliban are at this.

Radical islamists are often content with mediocre performance and achieve results without spending a fortune. They are content with modest military performance because of their reliance on divine guidance and destiny. And they save a lot of money by relying on the zeal of religiously motivated fighters rather than on high-tech weapons system.

The US in turn is and cannot be content with mediocre performance. Nationalistic sentiments notwithstanding, the level of zeal is not high enough to motivate the soldiers and the home front as much as religious sentiments if there are few battlefield victories and casualties amount. In addition, liberal democracies with voters interested in social stability and economic growth have no interest in enduring conflicts. Therefore the US cannot save a penny when planning and fighting its wars.

Where does this leave us? Successfully preparing for a modern war is more costly than a leader like Pericles holding an inspiring speech in ancient Athens and then ordering swords from a local smith. During the cold war, technological developments were meant to make it easier to beat the enemy while in reality they only made military technology and wars more expensive. The logical consequence is that the size of the US sphere of military interest should be shrinking because of the risk of hegemonic overreach.

The ever developing military technology does not always make it easier to win wars with smaller armies but calls for more troops when facing another modern army. And when facing a smaller irregular or hybrid enemy, more of the high-tech weapons systems are needed for victory. Either way, we have to as ourselves, how far does the US want to and need to reach militarily to create security and who will pay for it?